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I 
THE GLOBAL SLUMP AND "RULES OF THE GAME" 
Whether we ca l l  i t  a r e c e s s i o n ,  a d i s o r d e r  o r  a slump doos 
n o t  r e d l y  rnattep very  much; what i s  i m p o r t a n t ,  and beyond d i s p u t e  
now, is t h a t  it i s  g l o b a l  i n  i t s  r e a c h  and h a s  assumed s e r i o l i s  pro- 
p o r t i o n s .  I propose t o  a d d r e s s  myself t h e r e f o r e  t o  two ques t ions :  
f i r s t ,  what does  t h i s  slump s i g n i f y ?  and second, what are t h e r s f o r e  
t h e  " r u l e s  of t h e  game" i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  economic r e l a t i o n s  t c d a y  
ahd t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  p o l i c i e s  we f o l l o w  i n  I n d i a ?  
I f  we go by t h e  recorded  t r e n d s  i n  growth r a t e s ,  t h e  s o c i a l i s t  
c o u n t r i e s  have been e v i d e n t l y  a f f e c t e d  no l o s s  t h a n  t h e  c a p i t a l i s t .  
According t o  a r e c e n t  Uni ted Nat ions  e s t i m a t e ,  t h e  average r a t e  of 
growth of o u t p u t  i n  t h e  middle  of t h e  1960 ' s  was n e a r l y  73 per  c e n t  
p e r  annum i n  t h e  Q o r m b ~  ( i , c .  i n  t h e  so -ca l l ed  ' c e n t r a l l y  planned 
economiis l )  an3 54 per  c e n t  p e r  snnum i n  t h e  l a t t e r  (i.8. i n  both  t h e  
'developed market economies1 and t h e  'developing economies1). By t h e  
l a t t e r  ha l f  of t h e  1970 's  t h e s e  rates had f a l l e n  i n  both t o  around 
, 4 p e r  c e n t  p e r  annum; i n  1981 t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  oubput w a s b e l o w  2 per  cent 
i n  t h e s o c i a l i s t  c o u n t r i e s ,  less t h a n  I$ per  c e n t  i n  t h e  advanced capi-  
talist c o u n t r i e s ,  and j u s t  over  pe r  c e n t  i n  t h e  develo .>ing coun t r i es .  
The s h a r p  d e c l i n e  i n  growth r a t e s  i n  s o c i a l i s t  c c u n t r i e s  is 
c e r t a i n l y  s i g n i f i c a n t ,  and needs  t o  be i n v e s t i g a t e d  and s t u d i e d  very 
- - 
C 
T h i s  is t h e  s c r i p t  p repared  f o r  t h e  S i r  Purshothamdas Thakurdas Memo-* 
rial L e c t u r e  ("in honour of an eminent banker, s t a t e m a n  and p a t r i o t " )  
t o  be d e l i v e r e d  under  t h e  a u s p i c e s  o f  t h e  1 n d i a n . I n s t i t u t e  of Bankers 
a t  Bombay on December 6 ,  1982. I t  is n o t  t o  be r e l e a s e d  o r  quoted 
from b e f o r e  t h a t  d a t ~  - K.N.Raj. 
c a r e f u l l y .  I t  would be however i mis take  t o  i n f e r ,  from t h e  more o r  
l e s s  p a r a l l e l  movement i n  t h e  growth r a t e s  observed,  t h a t  t h e  r e a s o n s  
f o r  t h e  d e c e l e r a t i o n  have been t h e  same as t h o s e  t h a t  have brought  i t  
a b o u t  i n  t h e  c a p i t a l i s t  market  economies. The a v a i l a b l e  l i t e r a t u r e  on 
t h e  S o v i e t  Union p o i n t s  t o  some of  t h e  p o s s i b l e  r e a s o n s  f o r  d e c e l e r a t i o n  
such  a s  s h o r t a g e  of  manpower, o b s o l e s c e n t  t echno logy ,  s h o r t f a l l s  i n  
a g r i c u l t u r e ,  and i n s u f f i c i e n t  m o t i v a t i o n  f o r  r a i s i n g  l a b o u r  p r o d u c t i v i t y ;  
but we do n o t  still know enough t o  be a b l e  t o  o f f e r  any f i r m  hypo theses  
w i t h  adequa te  e m p i r i c a l  foundat ion.  
The economic r o s p o n s e  t o  such d e c e l e r a t i o n  i n  growth r a t e s  
c o u l d  a l s o  be v e r y  d i f f e r e n t  i n  s o c i a l i s t  c o u n t r i o s .  For  i n s t a n c e ,  
w h i l e  s t a n d a r d s  of consumption may be a l lowed t o  s u f f e r ,  it is  h i g h l y  
u n l i k e l y  t h a t  e i t h e r  t h e  l e v e l s  of employment o r  r a t e s  of inves tment  
a r e  c u t  down. I n  a n  e f f o r t  t o  raise grol l~th  r a t e s ,  t h e  rates of i n v e s t -  
ment may even be r a i s e d  and i m p o r t s  i n c r e a s e d  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  n e c e s s a r y  
t o  s u s t a i n  them. What r e p e r c u s s i o n s  a l l  t h e s e  w i l l  have on c o u n t r i e s  
l i k e  o u r s  is t h e r e f o r e  by no means clear. 
For t h e s e  r e a s o n s  I s h a l l  l e a v e  o u t  of  accoun t  t h e  slow-down 
i n  t h e  s o c i a l i s t  c o u n t r i e s  and c o n f i n e  t h e  r e s t  of  my o b s e r v a t i o n s  
l a r g e l y  t o  t h e  slump i n  t h e  c a p i t a l i s t  world. Here we are on more 
f a m i l i a r  t e r r i t o r y ,  though t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of  t h i s  slump are i n  
some i m p o r t a n t  r e s p e c t s  v e r y  d i f f e r e n t  from t h o s e  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  
slumps e a r l i e r .  
A broad h i s t o r i c a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  t h e s l u m p  i n  c a p i t a l i s t  
c o u n t r i e s  i s  t h a t  it marks t h e  end of a - p e r i o d  o f  unprecedented growth 
i n  p r o d u c t i v i t y  made p o s s i b l e  by a s p e c i a l  s e t  of c i r c u m s t a n c e s  f o l l o w i n g  
t h e  Sscond World War. E s s m t i a l l y  t h i s  was a p e r i o d  d u r i n g  which 
t h e  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  and organisation&l advances made earlier i n  t h o  
Uni ted  S t a t e s ,  and t h e  p a t t e r n s  of consUmption s o  f o s t e r e d ,  g o t  
t r + s m i t t e d  t o  and widely  s p r e a d  i n  about  1 0  t o  15 count r i es .  
These c o u n t r i e e ,  most ly  i n  Western Europe but  i n c l u d i n g  a l s o  
o t h e r s  such a s  Japan and A u s t r a l i a ,  were a l r e a d y  devslopsd i n d u s t r i a l l y  
and had most o f  t h e  p r e - r e q u i s i t e s  f o r  ach iev ing  h igh  l e v e l s  of pa- 
d u c t i v i t y ;  bu t  t h e i r  f u r t h e r  p r o g r e s s  had been r e t a r d e d  by t h e  two 
World Ware and t h e  p o l i t i c z l  and economic upheavols  i n  between. 
A f t e r  1945 t h e y  wers brought t o g e t h o r  i n  a v a r i e t y  of p o l i t i c a l ,  econo- 
mLc and m i l i t a r y  arrangements und-I t h e  l e a d e r s h i p  o f  t h e  United S t a t e s ,  
and t h i s  provided t h e  framowork i n  which r a p i d  g a i n s  c o u l d  be made, 
s p u r r e d  forward by h igh  r a t e s  of i n v e s t m s n t  and phenomenal growth j 
- 
i & ~ ~ a ~ n t ~ ~ - t r a d i n ~ - n p p o ~ n i t i & s .  The h igh  t i d e  of t h i s  g r e a t  
p o s e w a r  boom was i n  t h o  f i r s t  h a l f  of t h e  1960's. 
We have some broad d l m o n s i s l ~ ~ a l  e s t i m a t e s  of t h e  p r o d u c t i v i t y  
g a i n s  ach ieved  by t h s s s  c o u n t r i e s  i n  t h i s  way i n  t h o  c o u r s e  of two 
decades. I n  1950 t h o  average  o u t p u t  p e r  worker i n  t e n  of thom ( i n c l u d i n g  
Japan) ,  valued a t  t h e  r e l a t i v e  p r i c e s  p r e v a i l i n g  i n  t h o  United S t a t e s ,  
was o n l y  abou t  h a l f  a s  much as i n  t h a t  country.  I n  t h o  f o l l o w i n g  per iod  
p r o d u c t i v i t y  r o s e  as f a s t  as o v e r  i n  t h e  United S t a t e s ,  bu t  t h e  rate of 
i n c r e a s e  was s o  much f a s t e r  i n  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  by 1970 t h e i r  m& 
o u t p u t  p e r  worker was 70 pe? c e n t  a s  high. A c t u a l l y  i n  s o m  o f  them, 
s u c h  as i n  France,  West Germany and Japan,  where ox tens ivo  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  
upgrad ing  and m d a r n i r a t i a n  were under taken a long wi th  t h e  r e b u i l d i n g  
o f  industry a f t e r  t h e  War, t h e  d i f f e r e n c o a  in  p m d u c t L v i t y  were narrowad 
evon more. On t h o  o t h o r  hand, t h u  gap wos o v i d o n t l y  narrowed very  
.much less i n  t h e  c a s e  of B r i t a i n ,  which d i d  n o t  raise its rate of 
inves tment  t o  t h e  o x t e n t  r e q u i r e d  and l i v e d  j o y f u l l y  th rough  t h e  
good times of t h o  boom, o n l y  t o  f i n d  i t s e l f  handicappod w i t h  an 
i n c r e a s i n g l y  o b s o l e s c e n t  i n d u s t r i a l  s t r u c t u r e .  
But t h i s  i s  on ly  t h o  beginning cf t h e  s t o r y .  We are i n t e r e s t e d  
i n  what brought  t h i s  g r e a t  post-war boom t o  an and, and above a i l  w i t h  
, : 
t h e  r e a s o n s  f o r  t h e  i n f l a t i o n  t h a t  s o t  i n  soon a f t e w a r d s ,  t h e  c o n t i -  
. :  , 
nuing s t a g n a t i o n  and d e c l i n e  i n  oconomic a c t i v i t y ,  and t h o  a p p a r e n t  ~ ~. , 
, , 
i n a b i l i t y  of t h e  l e a d i n g  c o u n t r i e s  i n  t h e  c a p i t a l i s t  world t o  q c t  i n  
c o n c e r t  and r n v e r s e  t h e s e  t r e n d s .  
Many e x p l a n a t i o n s  have of c o u r s e  been p u t  forward.  S W  of them 
blame t h e  t r a d e  un ions  i n  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s  f o r  h i k i n g  up wages unroasona- 
b l y  and t h e  monetary and f i s c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  f o r  f o l l o w i n c  p o l i c i e s  
t h a t  made i t  p o s s i b l o  f o r  p r i c e s  ,nd wages t o  r i s o  cumulat ively .  Among 
them, t h o  ' m o n e t a r i s t s '  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  o r i g i n a l .  s i n  was i n  l e t t i n g  
. the  s t o c k  of pr imary money supp ly  i n c r e a s e  at  a P a s t o r  r a t e  than  o u t p u t ,  
and t h a t  e v e r y t h i n g  w i l l  be a l l  r i g h t  once c o n t r o l  i s  achievod ovor 
t h i s  crucia l .  v a r i a b l e .  Somo h o l d  t h ~  OPEC c o u n t r i o s  responsible f o r  
u n l e a s h i n g  waves of p r i c e  and c o s t  i n c r e a s e s  through s h a r p  and s u c c e s s i v o  
h i k e s  i n  t h o  p r i c e  o f  o i l .  Some o t h e r s  t a k e  t h o  view tha t ,bo low all 
t h e s e  phenomena on t h o  s u r f a c o , a r e  t h e  u n c o n t r o l l e d  a c t i v i t i a s  o f  o l igo-  
p o l i s t i c  e n t e r p r i s e s  ( i n c l u d i n g  m u l t i - n a t i o n d ' s )  soeking h i g h e r  p r o f i t  , 
margins  r e g a r d l e s s  o f  what happens t o  p r i c e s ,  output, o r  employment. 
A s i r $ ~ l o  i n t o r p r c t a t i o n  of  dl t h i s  cou ld  bc of  courso  t h a t  
thoy  r e f l e c t  t h e  magnituda and complexi ty  of t h e  c r i s i s  now a f f l i c t i n g  
t h o  c a p i t a l i s t  world. And no doubt  such an o b s e r v a t i o n  i s  n o t  unwarranted. 
Howovcr it would be an  o x p l a n a t i o n  of  on ly  t h o  c u r r e n t  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  
p o r c o p t i o n ,  and of t h e  c o n f u s i o n s  and u n c o r t a i n t i o s  s u r r o u n d i n g  them, 
n o t  o f  t h e  u n d o r l y i n g  t r e n d s  i n  t h e  c a p i t a l i s t  oconomios which havo 
g iven  r i s o  t o  t h o s o  phenomena. And c e r t a i n l y  i t  o f f e r s  no c l u o  t o  
, 
what t h o  f u t u r o  h o l d s  and what i t s  p o s s i b l o  i m p l i c a t i o n s  aro. 
Only f o o l s ' r u s h  i n  whcro a n g o l s  f o a r  t o  t r e a d ,  s o  t h e  s a y i n g  
goes. One h a s  t o  bo t h e r e f o r e  ve ry  c i rcumspac t  i n  o f f e r i n g  any a l t e r -  
n a t i v o  exp lana t ion .  Certainly we a r e  t o o  n e a r  t h e  e v e n t s  t o  bo a b l e  
t o  comprehend them f u l l y  and u n d e r s t a n d  t h o i r  meaning and s i g n i f i c a n c e  
i n  propor  h i s t o r i c a l  perspective. A t  t h o  same t imo i t  i s  essential 
t o  havo somo k ind  of a  working h y p o t h e s i s ,  c o n s i s t o n t  w i t h  whatever 
we know; and it i s  t h o r o f o r o  i n  t>is s p i r i t ,  w i t h  a l l  t h o  dua q u a l i -  
f i c a t i o n s  and r o s e r v a t i o n s ,  t h a t  I s h a l l  p r e s e n t  such  a  hypothesis 
here .  
T h i e  h y p o t h e s i s  is s imply  t h a t ,  f o r  a v a r i e t y  o f  reasons, 
h a s  developed a  b a s i c  i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y  i n  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s ,  t h e  l e a d i n 0  
c o u n t r y  i n  t h a  c a p i t a l i s t  world,  between t h e  p o l i c i e s  i t  needs  t o  f o l l o e  
f o r  m a i n t a i n i n g  and improving its c o m p e t i t i v e  p o s i t i o n  as an i n d u s t r i a l  
power and t h e  p o l i c i e s  it f i n d s  compel led  t o  f o l l o w  - 
f o r  s t r o n g t h o n i n g  i t s  f i n a n c i a l  hogomony and its 
investment a c t i v i t i e s  abroad. I t  r e s t s  e s s e n t i a l l y  on t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
p r o p o s i t i o n s  f o r  which c o n s i d e r a b l e  ' e m p i r i c a l  ovidencd i s  a v a i l a b l e r  
Hou6vor, n o t  on ly  has  t h e r e  been no consonsus of o p i n i o n  among 
p r o f e s s i o n a l  economists  on t h e s o  different d iagnoses  of t h o  mala i se  
b u t  oven p r a c t i c a l  men o f  a f f a i r s ,  who a r o  c r e d i t o d  wi th  g r e a t e r  i n t u i -  
t i v e  undors tand ing ,  have f a i l e d  t o  show rmch coherence and c o n s i s t e n c y  
i n  t h o i r  pronouncemorlts. T h i s  h a s  boon t h o  case p a r t i c u l a r l f i n  t h e  
Uni ted S t a t e s  i n  r o c e n t  years .  What is ono t o  make, f o r  i n s t a n c o ,  of 
P r e s i d a n t  Reagan coming o u t  t h i s  y e a r  wi th  t h e  l a r g o s t  budgot d e f i c i t  
i n  t h o  h i s t o r y  of t h o  United S t a t o s  a f t e r  proc*ming t h a t  t h o  t o t a l  
e l i m i n a t i o n  of such d o f i c i t s  was t h o  c a n t r o - p i e c e  of h i s  a n t i - i n f l a t i o n a r y  
programme? Or how is one t o  interpret t h e  o r a c u l a r  o b s e r v a t i o n s  of 
Chairman Volcker o f  t h o  F e d e r a l  Reservo on money supp ly  and i n t e r e s t  
r a t e s  i n  t h e  United S t a t o s ?  
Thoro a r e  s e v e r a l  o t h o r  mys t i fy ing  f e a t u r e s  i n  t h e  g l o b a l  scene 
t o d a y  which seem t o  defy any l o g i c a l l y  c o n s i s t e n t  oxplanat ion.  For 
i n s t a n c o ,  why h a s  t h e  exchange va lue  of t h e  d o l l a r  remained s o  h i g h  i n  
t h o  l as t  two y e a r s  when t h o  U n i t e d , S t a t e s  h a s  had l a r g o  d e f i c i t s  i n  i ts 
i n  commoditios 
o x t e r n a l  trado/and t h o  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  a  downward d r i f t  i n  i ts  valuo has  
- 
been n o t  i n c o n s i d e r a b l e ?  I f  t h i s  was on account  of t h o  very high 
i n t e r e s t  r a t o s  mainta ined i n  t h e  Uni tad S t a t e s  d u r i n g  t h i s  pe r iod ,  
stimulat ' .ng l a r g o  i n f l o w s  of c a p i t a l  from abroad,  why d i d  n o t  i t s  va lue  
d r o p  whon t h o s e  i n t o r e s t  r a t o s  wore r o c e n t l y  allowod t o  fall q u i t o  
s h a r p l y ?  What can e x p l a i n  t h o  c o n s i d o r a h l o  d o c l i n c  i n  t h e  valuo of t h e  
yen p r e c i s e l y  a t  t h i s  p o i n t ,  even though Japan has  boon p i l i n g  up an 
onormous t r a d o  surplLls? And what moaning i s  ono t o  soa i n  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  
c r i s i s  i n  Japan over  a p p a r e n t l y  n o t h i n g  more t h a n  t h o  c o n t i n u i n g  d e f i c i t  
i n  t h e  governmont budget (labsorbing h a r d l y  ono-sixth of t h e  c o u n t r y ' s  
g r o s s  sav ing ,  which i t s e l f  i s  a s  high a s  one- thi rd  of its gros ' s  n a t i o n a l  
p roduc t )?  
t ho  i n d u s t r i a l  dynamism o f  the  Un i ted  States, 
h i t h a r t o  r e s t i n g  h e a v i l y  on s t e e l  and cheap 
sources o f  onergy, has been s e r i o u s l y  under- 
mined by bo th  th: obsolesence o f  the  e a r l i e r  
s t e o l  technology and by t h e  more recent  rise 
i n  energy costs; 
i n  t h e  absence o f  a compensating t e c h n o l o g i c d  
break-through, n o t  c i i l y  has i n d u s t r i a l  p r o d u c t i v i t y  
cemed t o  grow a t  the  same r a t e  as bsfore,but the  
t r e n d  of r i s i n g  wagca, s e t  moving i n  the  pe r iod  c f  
r a p i d l y  i nc roas ing  p r o d u c t i v i t y ,  has r a i s e d  u n i t  
labour  costs and c u t  q u i t c  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  i n t o  the  
r e l a t i v e  share o f  p r o f i t s  i n  U.S. indus t ry ;  
s ince  tho  newer i n d u s t r i a l  s t ruc tu res  o f  count r ies  
l i k e  Japan have incorpora ted  the  more e f f i c i e n t  
s t e e l  technology,+ and are moreover b e t t e r  designed 
t o  save enorgy and o ther  i n p u t  costs, American 
i n d u s t r y  has a l so  su f fe red  ser ious  setbacks i n  i t s  
compet i t i ve  strength, and has been the re fo ro  unable 
t o  main ta in  i t s  p o s i t i o n  w i thout  t h o  subport of 
extraneous measures such as devaluat ion of the  
d o l l a r  and var ious  forms o f  preference and protect ion;  
a t  t ho  same timo, t h o  dec l i ne  i n  the  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  
o f  i n d u s t r y  within t h e  Un i ted  States, together  w i t h  
t h e  prospect o f  ea rn ing  h igher  r e t u r n s  abroad opened 
Up by American mul t i -nat ionals,  have s t imu la ted  a 
considsrablo ou t f l ow  of cap i ta l ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  a f t o r  
I n  popular  l i t c r a t u r e ,  Peter Drucker was porhaps tho  f i r s t  t o  p o i n t  out  
very c l e a r l y  towards tho  ond of the  1960's t h a t  t ho  stool-making processes 
embodied i n  t h e  e x i s t i n g  i n d u s t r y  had become g ross l y  unoconomical. Nothing 
was moro expensive, he observed, than c r e a t i n g  h i g h  tumporatures# and ye t  
these procossos i nvo l ved  such c r o a t i o n  o f  h i g h  temperatures th roe t imes 
over, on l y  t o  quench them imrncdiatoly t he rea f te r  (which was j u s t  as expen- 
s i v o  as haating). No l o s s  expensive i n  terms o f  cos t  and e f f o r t  was 
moving o f  heavy woights, and y o t  i n  steel-making h o t  meltod s t o e l  i n  
h i g h l y  co r ros i ve  form had t o  bo moved again and again ovar l o n g  distancoe. 
To rega in  i t s  growth dynamics, he added, t h e  cost  o f  s t e e l  w o r n h a v e  
t o  be lowered by a t  l o a s t  onc-third, and such a techno log ica l  r e v o l u t i o n  
i n  s t e e l  making had on l y  j u s t  begun. Cf .  Peter  Drucker, The Ass o f  
D i s c o n t i n u i t y  (1968). 
Since Japan began tho  phenomenal expansion o f  i t s  s t e o l  i n d u s t r y  r a t h e r  
l a t o ,  i t  has been ab lo  t o  adopt t h e  new oxygen process (a major step, as 
Petor Drucker po in ted  out, towards conver t ing  steel-making from a 
mechanical t o  a chemical i n d u s t r y )  as ,we l l  as t h e  new technique o f  
'continuous cas t i ng '  ("which e l im ina tes  wastes o f  temperature and 
s u b s t i t u t e s  g r a v i t y  f l o w  o f  raw s t e e l  t o  and through the  f i n i s h i n g  
equipment. f o r  t h e  expensive and dangerous l i f t i n g ,  haul ing, and moving 
of i n d i v i d u a l  batches"). Moreover t h e  new g i g a n t i c  s t e e l  p lan ts  o f  
Japan aro l o c a t o d  near deop-water p o r t s  where i r o n  ore  can be t ransported 
t o  and unloadod a t  r ~ l a t i v s l y  low cost. 
t h o  midd le  of t h o  1 9 6 0 ' s ;  and t h i s  p r o c e s s  h a s  
boon onormouslg l1e3,>J by t h o  unques t ionnod  
p o s i t i o n  of  t h e  d o l l a r  as r e s e r v e  c u r r o n c y  a f t e r  
t h o ' l i q u i d a t i o n  o f  t h e  B r a t t o n  Woods regimo i n  
1971,  t h e  r a p i d  growth of  t h o  Euro-currency 
marke t s  i n  t h e  f o l l o u i n g  y e a r s ,  and above a11 by 
t h o  a b i l i t y  of  t h o  Uni tod  S t a t e s  w i t h  i t s  p o l i t i c a l ,  
m i l i t a r y  and f i n a n c i a l  power t o  a t t r a c t  and r e c y c l o  
t h r o u g h  Amorican banks a  v e r y  h i g h  p r o p o r t i o n  of  
t h o  d u l l a r s  p a i d  o u t  t o  OPEC c o u n t r i e s ;  
( v )  c o n s o q u o n t l y ,  w h i l e  g r o s s  c o r p o r a t e  p r o f i t s  f rom 
domogt ic  manufacture i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  amounted 
t o  l o s s  t h a n  $ 75 b i l l i o n  i n  1980 ( j u s t  abou t  
5  p e r  c e n t  o f  i t s  g r o s e  n a t i o n a l  p r o d u c t ) ,  t h e  
g r o s e  p r o f i t s  of  f i n a n c i a l  companies  ( o x c l u d i n g  
F e d e r a l  Rese rve  Banks) woro n e a r l y  $ 1 9  b i l l i o n  
and t h e  c o r p o r a t e  p r o f i t s  e a r n e d  ab road  amountod 
t o  o v e r  $4 31 b i l l i o n ;  t h e  l a s t  two addod up  
t h o r e f o r o  t o  as much a s  two- th i rds  of  t h e  f i rs t  
i n  1980 ( w h i l e  t h e y  amounted t o  o n l y  o n e - f i f t h  
i n  1950 a'nd a b o u t  one -qua r t e r  oven as l a t e  as 1965), 
r e f l o c t i n g  t h e  c o n s i d o r a b l e  growth i n  i m p o r t a n c e  
of f i n a n c i a l  and e x t o r n a l  b u s i n o s s  i n t e r e s t s  r o l a t i v e  
t o  t h a t  o f  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  i n t e r e s t s  w i t h i n  t h e  
c o u n t r y  d u r i n g  t h o  l a s t  docado a n d , a  h d f ;  and 
l a s t l y ,  
( v i )  i n  t h o  l i g h t  o f  t h e s e  developments, t h o r o  h a s  
o v i d o n t l y  embrgod . i n  t h e  Un i t ed  S t a t o s  a f a i r l y  
s h a r p  c o n f l i c t  o f  i n t c r c s t s  b e t w o o n ~ t h o s o  who a r o  
p r i m a r i l y  concorned w i t h  manufac tu r ing  w i t h i n  t h o  
c o u n t r y ,  f o r  whom n much d o p r e c i a t o d  d o l l a r  and 
lowor  i n t o r o s t  r a t e s  would h e l p  g r o a t l y  t o  improve 
t h o i r  o o m p o t i t i v o  p o s i t i o n  and promote t h o  u r g o n t l y  
r e q u i r e d  i n c r e a s e s  i n  investment, and t h o s e  whoso 
c o n c e r n s  a r e  p r i m a r i l y  l i n k e d  w i t h  t h e  supremacy o f  
t h e  d o l l a r  i n  t h o  f i n a n c i a l  marke t s  o f  t h o  wor ld  'Mr 
which i t  is  h i g h l y  c l e s i r a h l e  t h a t  i t  r e t a i n s  a h i g h  
and s t a b 1 0  e x t e r n a l  d u o .  
T h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of r e c e n t  developments i n  t h o  U n i t e d  
S t a t e s  o v e r  t h o  l a s t  decade  may a p p e a r  r a t h e r  e s o b r i c  and s t r a n g e ;  
b u t  t h e y  a r e  b a s i c a l l y  n o t  v e r y  d i f f e r e n t  i n  c h a r a c t e r  and d i r e c t i o n  
f r b m  t h e  developmants  i n  Br i t a in  a c e n t u r y  ago when t h o  i n n o v a t i o n s  
which had  p r o p o l l o d  i t s  i n d u s t r i a l  r e v o l u t i o n  g o t  exhaus ted .  - The 
a l r e a d y  low r a t e  of n o t  i n v s s t m e n t  w i t h i n  t h e  B r i t i s h  economy a t  t h a t  
t imo (no h igho r  than 5 por conk ~f i t s  n a t i o n a l  income i n  t h e  l a s t  
quar te r  o f  t ho  1 9 t h  cantury)  dippod s t i l l  f u r t h e r ,  wh i l e  savings began 
t o  f l o w  abroad i n  growing dimonsions t i l l  t h e  r a t e  o f  f o r e i g n  invos t -  
ment rose  t o  nea r l y  83 por  oont o f  t h o  n a t i o n a l  incomo i n  the  years 
immediately procoding tho  F i r s t  World W a r .  
I t  was aga ins t  t h i s  background t h a t  t h e  Bank o f  England, w i t h  
i t s  c loso  asdoc ia t ion  w i t h  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  inter6st.s i n  t h e  C i t y  o f  
London, was i n c l i n e d  t o  keep changing i t s  Bank Rate i n  quick response 
t o  g o l d  movomonts w i thou t  much concern f o r  tho  consequences on the  
domestic oconomy. It was a lso  on account o f  t h i s  e a r l i e r  t r a d i t i o n ,  
and e x t e r n a l  o r i en ta t i on ,  t h a t  B r i t a i n  was so anxious t o  r e s t o r e  tho  
o l d  par,valuo of tho  pound s t e r l i n g  i n  terms o f  go ld  a f t e r  the  F i r s t  
World War, dosp i te  a l l  t h e  ser idue d e f l a t i o n a r y  consoquonccs i n  tho  
1920's Koynes had wornod against. 
Thore aro o f  course soms m p o r t a n t  d i f f e rences  botweon t h e  
s i t u a t i o n  then and now, and these d i f f e rences  are porhaps c r u c i a l  
f o r  understanding t h e  comploxi t ios and confusions t h a t  are so obvious 
now. The Un i ted  States commands i n  tho  f i r s t  p lace a much wider range 
of n a t u r a l  and scientific resources than B r i t a i n  over had, and thorefore, 
even though t h e  problems i t  facos i n  r e b u i l d i n g  a f resh t h e  e a r l i a r  
i n d u s t r i e s  l i k e  s t e e l  appoar t o  be formidablo, t h e  pro8pects of a  
now generat ion o f  i n d u s t r i e s  emerging, based on new technology and 
new sourcos o f  energy, and p rov id ing  l a r g o  and h i g h l y  p r o f i t a b l e  
investment  n u t l e t s  w i t h i n  the  oconomy are very much greater. It s t i l l  
r e t a i n s  leadorsh ip  i n  s o v o r a l  i n d u s t r i e s  such as i n  t h e  chemical, 
machine-manufacturing, e l e c t r o n i c  and aero-space indus t r ies .  
For those reasons, tho  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  invostment i n  domestic 
manufacturing i n d u s t r y  doc l i n ing  i n  t h e  Un i ted  Statos and a h i g h  
p r o p o r t i o n  o f  savings seoking f o r o i g n  investment i s  r a t h o r  remote. 
The r o l o  o f  American f o r o i g n  invostment, through i t s  mul t i -nat ionals,  
w i l l  be a s s o n t i a l l y  t o  p rov ido  a complementary and support ing r o l e  t o  
. 
the manufactur ing industries w i t h i n  (though, i n  t h e  case of soma o f  
tho  i n d u s t r i e s  t h a t  aro not  being ros t ruc turod,  ronovatod or  otherwiso 
rov i rad ,  there  cou ld  w e l l  be c o n f l i c t s  of i n to ros t ) .  
On the  o t h s r  hand, w i t h  t h e  dethronement o f  go ld  from t h e  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  monatky  systom, and tho  considerable economic, m i l i t a r y  
and f i nanc ia l ' power  o f  t h e  Un i ted  States, t h o  prospects of i t s  ga in ing  
. 
command over t h e  o n t i r e  wor ld  economy through t h e  dominance o f . t he  
d o l l a r  are now greater  than they over wore f o r  B r i t a in .  I n  f ac t ,  i n  the  
caso o f  B r i t a i n ,  it was s o  r i g i d l y  t i e d  t o  tho  go ld  standard, and the  
system was oporated w i t h  such s m c l l  go ld  reserves o f  i t s  own (no more 
than about C 12 i r c l l l i on  i n  t h e  l a s t  quar te r  of t h e  1 9 t h  century), t h a t  
. . 
i t  enjoyed very l i t t l c  f l e x i b i l i t y .  Tho so-cal lod " ru les  of t hd  gamo" 
o f  tho  i n t s r n a t i o n a l  go ld  standard trapped tho  dominant pawer a t  t h a t  
t ime almost as much as those who wcro boing dominated; B r i t a i n  r o a l i z o d  
i t  rmch too  l a t e ,  i n  1931, by when i t s  p o s i t i o n  as an i n d u s t r i a l  pOWr 
had been so t o t a l l y  erodod t h a t  i t  was n o t  able t o  rega in  i t s  supremacy. 
The Un i ted  States has l o a r n t  t h i s  lesson q u i t e  w e l l  and, when 
Presidont  Nixon bocame a conver t  t o  Keynesianism and completely de-l inked 
t h e  d o l l a r  from g o l d  i n  1971, what ho u.as dec la r i ng  i n  e f f e c t  was i t s  
de terminat ion  t o  make i t s  own r u b s  and change thom as and when i t  s u i t e d  
i t s  n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t s .  Cold was dothroncd and i n  its p l a c e  was 
enthroned t h e  d o l l a r  which by then ,  r a t h e r  l i k e  P r e s i d e n t  Nixon h imse l f ,  
had developed a m b i t i c u s  i m p e r i u l  i n t e r e s t s .  I t  is n o t  perhaps  an a c c i d e n t  
t h a t  t h i s  was t h e  y e a r  when h e  a l s o  c a l l e d  on Chairman Mao and s t a r t e d  
f o r g i n g  a  new p o l i t i c a l  a l l i a n c e  t h a t  was t o  have fa r - reach ing  consequences 
o n  t h e  b a l a n c e  of power i n  t h e  world. 
A l l  t h i s  gave t h e  United S t a t e s  a h igh  dogre0 o f  maneouvrabi l i ty  
i n  economic and p o l i t i c a l  a f f a i r s .  I t  i s  n o t  t h e r e f o r o  s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  
a f t e r  a g r e e i n g  i n  t h e  l a t e  1960 ' s  t o  t h e  c r e a t i o n  of SDFs (as a major 
r e s e r v e  a s s e t  t h a t  c o u n t r i e s  cou ld  h o l d  a l t e r n a t i v e l y  t o  t h e  d o l l a r )  - 
t h i s  was perhaps  on ly  a tact ical  coocoss ion,  i n  response  t o  t h e  s t r o n g  
French advocacy of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  monetary system based on go ld  - 
t h e  L'bitBd S t a t e s  h a s  s i n c e  t h a n  shown no g r e a t  en thus iasm f o r  bu i ld ing  
up an a l t e r n z t i v e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  monetary regime based l a r g e l y  on SDRs. 
The I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Monetary Fund c x ~ l d  became a  s e r i o u s  embarassment i f  
g i v s n  an o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  t u r n  t h e  t a b l e s  and e n f o r c e  f l c o n d i t i o n a l i t i e s "  
on t h a  United S t a t e s ;  s o  it was b e t t e r  t o  keep i t  i n  an essentially 
s u b s e r v i e n t  p o s i t i o n s ,  on ly  e n f o r c i n g  t h e  changing r u l e s  of t h e  game 
a s  r e a u i r e d  bv t h e  United Stntan- 
The Uni ted S t a t e s  ussd  i t s  improved manoeuvrab i l i ty ,  gained by 
. 
t h e  dethronement of go ld ,  f i r s t  t o  deva lue  t h e  d s l l a r  a l i t t l e  and t h e n  
t o  l a u n c h  such a free f l o a t  of its e x t e r n a l  v a l u e  t h a t  w i t h i n  two 
y e a r s  it was f u r t h e r  devalued by n e a r l y  40 per  c e n t  i n  r o l o t i o n  t o  t h e  
deu t sche  mark. T h i s  improved t h e  competiCIiveness of American manufa- 
c t u r i n g  i n d u s t r y  s o ' c o n s i d e r a b l y  t h a t ,  a long  wi th  t h e  o t h e r  moasures 
taken a t  t h a t  t ime  (such as increased government spending), t he re  was 
a phenomenal inc rease both i n  t h e  expor ts  from t h e  Un i ted  States and 
i n  t h e  quantum of corporate p r o f i t s  earned from manufacturing. 
Thus, t h e  value o f  Arrsrican merchandise exports, which never 
exceeded 4 per cent  o f  i t s  gross n a t i o n a l  product a l l  through t h e  1960's. 
rose s t e a d i l y  from 1972 and touched noa r l y  8 per cent  o f  t h e  gross 
n a t i o n a l  product by t h e  end o f  t hc  1970's. Corporate p r o f i t s  from 
manufacturing, which had f l u c t u o t o d  arcund $ 40 b i l l i o n  psr  annum 
. 
between 1965 and 1974, rose sharp ly  t h e r e a f t e r  t o  nea r l y  $ 90 b i l l l d n  
by 1979. The consequent upswing i n  t h e  American economy increased a lso 
i t s  impor ts  and thereby holpsd t o  r e v i v e  economic a c t i v i t y  the  world 
over i n  tho  second h a l f  o f  t h e  1970's. 
The c o n t r i b u t i o n  t h a t  the  devaluat ion o f  t h e  d o l l a r  made t o  t h e  
sharp i n f l a t i o n a r y  pressures t h a t  developed dur ing  t h i s  por iod  has no t  
been however s u f f i c i e n t l y  highlighted i n  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  on t h i s  subject  
(except i n  the  w r i t i n g s  o f  Professor Robert T r i f f i n ) .  Since e x t e r n a l  
payments on both  cu r ren t  and c a p i t a l  account cou ld  be freely'made i n  
d o l l a r  ( w i t h  a l l  con t ro l s  on ou t f low o f  c a p i t a l  removed e a r l y  i n  1974), 
and such d o l l a r  ou t f lows became the  bas is  o f  t h e  phenomenal growth i n  
euro-currency markets over which no c o n t r o l  cou ld  be oxerc isod by anyone, 
they  have been a major f a c t o r  s t i m u l a t i n g  and support ing waves o f  specula- 
t i o n  i n  t h e  commodity markets all over t h e  world. To the  ex ten t  they 
a lso  incroased t h e  f o r e i g n  exchange resorves of other  count r ies  there 
have boon secondary e f f e c t s  of enormous dimensions acce le ra t i ng  t h e  
Upward movement o f  prices. 
I n  f a c t ,  it is t h e  ve ry  l a r g e  r i s o  i n  p r i c e s  s o  induced all 
along t h e  l i n e  that '  neutralized a s u b s t a n t i a l  p a r t  of  t h o  g a i n s  of 
t h o  OPEC c o u n t r i o s  from t h e  f i r s t  h i k e  i n  o i l  p r i c e  and provoked 
them t o  go i n  f o r  a n o t h e r  s h a r p  h i k o  i n  p r i c e  i n  1979. I t  needs  t o  
be  mentionod h e r e  t h a t  s i n c e  i m p o r t s  of  o i l  by o t h o r  c o u n t r i o s  wero 
a lmos t  u n i v o r s a l l y  i n v o i c e d  i n  d o l l a r s ,  and t h e  d o l l a r  p r i c o s  were 
r a i s o d  a s  t h o  d o l l a r  g o t  d e p r e c i a t e d ,  t h e  d e v a l u a t i o n  of  t h e  d o l l a r  
brought  r e a l l y  no r e l i e f  t o  t h e  o i l - impor t ing  c o u n t r i e s .  I n  due c o u r s e  
t h i s  mothod of p r i c i n g  was adopted by e x p o r t e r s  of  many o t h e r  commo- 
d i t i o s .  The b e l i o f  t h a t  a  sys tem of  f l o a t i n g  exchmgo r a t e s  would 
i n s u l a t e  c o u n t r i e s  wi th  appreciating c u r r a n c i e s  from t h e  impac t  of 
i n f l a t i o n  olsewhoro h a s  t h e r o f o r o  boon d i sp roved  i n  p r a c t i c e  t o  a  vory  
c o n s i d c r a b l o  dogrce. 
S i m i l a r l y ,  f o r  t h o  samo roasons ,  it i s  n o t  t r u o  t h a t  i t  i s  t h e  
u n r e a s o n a b l e  wago domands cf l a b o d  t h a t  havo been t h o  main f o r c o  behind 
t h o  i n f l a t i o n a r y  movement i n  p r i c o s  o i t h e r  w i t h i n  t h o  Uni ted  S t a t o s  o r  
olsewhero.  I n  g o n o r a l  w o n  t h o  o r g a n i s e d  l a b o u r  i n  t h o  advancod c a p i t a -  
l is t  c o u n t r i e s  havo sough t  no mom t h a n  r i s o  i n  wages t o  compcnsato f o r  
rise i n  consumer p r i c o s ,  and still n o t  q u i t e  succooded i n  m a i n t a i n i n g  
t h e i r  real wagos. What h a s  b a s i c a l l y  c r o a t e d  t h o  problem is  'chat 
p r o d u c t i v i t y  h a s  coased t o  grow i n  a wide rango o f  i n d u s t r i e s ;  and 
u n d e r  s u c h  c o n d i t i o n s  wago increases (whatovor t h o  undor ly ing  r e a s o n s )  
do t o n d  t o  a f f o c t  p r o f i t s  advorso ly  evon a f t o r  p a r t  of  t h o  i n c r c a s o s  
i n  c o s t  a r e  passed  on th rough  r i s o  i n  p roduc t  p r i c e s .  N a t u r a l l y ,  i n  
c o u n t r i o s  l i k e  Gormany and Japan,  whero t h o r o  havo boon c o n t i n u i n g  
p r o d u c t i v i t y  i n c r o a s o s ,  t h o s o  probloms havo boon vory  much under  con t ro l .  
I t  i s  t h o  cumula t ivo  i n f l c t i o n a r y  movomont causod by a l l  thoso  
' f a c t o r s  w i t h i n  t h o  Unitod S t a t o s  and o u t s i d o ,  and abovo a l l  t h o  doubts  
t h a t  bogan t o  davolop t h e  world ovor  abou t  t h o  s t a b i l i t y  and r e l i a b i l i t y  
o f  t h o  d o l l a r  a s  a  r o s o r v o  a s s o t  ( a s  i t s  o x t o r n a l  va luo  continued t o  
d r i f t  downwards), t h a t  causod a s h a r p  r o v o r s a l  of  p o l i c i o s  i n  t h o  
Uni ted  S t a t o s  around 1980. I t  was a l l  r i g h t  t o  l o t  t h o  o x t o r n a l  valuo 
o f  t h o  d o l l a r  drop a s  l o n g  a s  i t  holpod t o  improvo t h o  compot i t ivo  
p o s i t i o n  of Amorican manufactur ing i n d u s t r y  a t  p r a c t i c a l l y  no c o s t  t o  
t h o  United S t a t e s .  Bu t  whon t h o  o x t o r n a l  v a l u o  of t h o  d o l l a r  s l i d  s o  ' 
low as it had by t h o  end of  t h o  1970'9 ( r o f l o c t o d ,  f o r  instance, i n  tho  
deu t scho  mark-dollar  oxchango r a t 0  f a l l i n g  t o  1.8 i n  1979 from i ts  
o a r l i o r  l o v o l  of  3.5 i n  1971) ,  and moroovor t h o  p r i c o  of g c l d  suddenly  
s h o t  up t o  ovor  $ 800 por  ounco ( r o f l c c t i n g  t h o  apporon t ly  growing 
p r e f o r s n c o  of h o l d o r s  of  f i n a n c i a l  a s s o t s  For g o l d ) ,  t h o  s i g n a l s  woro 
char  and unmistakoable.  Unless  somothing ve ry  d r a s t i c  was dono t o  
r e s t o r e  conf idonco i n  i t s  s t a b i l i t y  end i n t o g r i t y , t h o r o  was a  r o a l  
dangor of t h o  d o l l a r  g o t t i n g  dothronod i n  f a v o u r  of o i t h o r  g o l d ,  t h o  
monarch doposod o a r l i o r  s t i l l  w a i t i n g  i n  t h o  wings ( l i k o  somo o t h o r  
doposod monarchs), o r  a domoorat ic  and republican c a n d i d a t o  i n  
t h o  form of  SDRs w i t h i n  a  fu l l -b loodod and t r u l y  i n t o r n o t i o n a l  monotary 
systom. T h i s  was o b v i o u s l y  t o o  t o r r i b l o  a p r o s p o c t  f o r  any p a t r i o t i c  
American t o  viow wi th  oquanimity ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  s i n c e  it would have 
s t r u c k  a  body blow t o  t h o  f i n a n c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  powor wioldod by 
t h o  United S t a t o s .  
The o n l y  way of p r o v e n t i n g  such a  c a t a s t r o p h e  was t o  mako it 
c l c a r  by any moans whatovcr t h a t  t h o  d o l l a r  was a t  l o a s t  as s t a b l o  a s ,  
i f  no t  more than, any othor  f i n a n c i a l  assut i n c l u d i n g  gold. This 
requ i red  g e t t i n g  p r i c e  r i s o s  w i t h i n  tho  Uni ted States under cont ro l ,  
regardless of t ho  impact t h a t  t h e  measures taken f o r  t h e  purpose might 
have on o i t h o r  monufacturing i n d u s t r y  o r  omploymont w i t h i n  t h e  country. 
Natura l l y ,  a t  t h i s  stage, t ho  'monotar is t '  pnoscr ip t ions  had great  
appeal, f o r  what cou ld  be a more obvious s o l u t i o n  than t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  
one of r a i s i n g  i n t o r e s t  r a t e s  sharp ly  as t h e  Bank o f  England vould 
have done if i t  had boon fo rced i n t o  a s i m i l a r  predicament i n  t h e  
l a t e  19 th  century? Somehow t h e  vory  s i m p l i c i t y  of 'monotarism' makes 
* i t  p o l i t i c a l l y  vory saleable, desp i te  i t s  t o t a l l y  f a l l a c i o u s  premises. 
* 
Honry Kaufman, who i s  supposed t o  be t h e  Guru o f  the  New York Stock 
Exchange, was content t o  go along w i t h  monetarism t i l l  he discovered 
r e c e n t l y  a concoptual problem and made tho f o l l o w i n g  observations: 
"Perhaps tho  most s i g n i f i c a n t  conceptual problom w i t h  'monotarism' 
i s  t h e  cont inuously  changing naturo  o f  whot we regard as money. 
F i n a n c i a l  innovat ion ,  which i s  p r i m a r i l y  respons ib le  f o r  these changes 
has boon encuuraged by tho  monetar is t  approach. That i s ,  monctzrisrn 
has r s i s c d  tho  oppor tun i ty  costs o f  remaining w i t h i n  tho  confines o f  
rogu la t ion .  Money, morcovor, i s  always rodef inod by t ho  Federal 
Reserve w a l l  a f t e r  any f i n a n c i a l  i nnova t i on  has occurrod. Tho 
c e n t r a l  bank, consequently, i s  always p lay ing  catch-up. Since 
November 1978, t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  money has been a l t e r e d  f o u r  times, 
and the  o r i g i n a l  concept expanded by $ 90 b i l l i o n .  Nevertheless, 
t h i s  cons tant ly  redef ined e n t i t y  cont inuos t o  be a dec l i n ing  f r a c t i o n  
of nominal GNP". C f .  "Danger: Too Much Turbulonce", Challenqe, May- 
June 1982. Th is  l i t t l e  b i t  o f  oconomic wisdom was i n  f a c t  known 
t o  Honry Thornton, whc was c l o s e l y  associated with t h e  C i t y  o f  
London noa r l y  two contur ies  ago. As an o c t i v o  p a r t i c i p a n t  i n  the  
monetary controvers ies o f  t h a t  t ime he had expla ined t h i s  vory 
c l o m l y  i n  a famous t r e a t i s e  publ ished i n  1802: ".....if bank 
paper woro abolished, a s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  i t  would be l i k o l y  t o  be 
found, t o  a c e r t a i n  degree, i n  b i l l s  o f  exchange ...... i f  b i l l s  
and bank notes were extinguished, o ther  substitutes than go ld  would 
unquest ionably be found... Banks would be i n s t i t u t e d ,  n o t  o f  tho  
d e s c r i p t i o n  which now ex i s t ,  but  o f  t h e  k i n d  and numbor which would 
servo best t o  sparo both the  t r o u b l e  o f  gold, and tho  expence i ncu r red  
by t h e  l o s s  o f  i n t e r e s t  upon t h e  q u a n t i t y  o f  i t  i n  possession..... 
C red i t  would s t i l l  ex i s t ;  c r e d i t  i n  books, c r e d i t  depending on t h e  
test imony of witnesses, o r  t h e  mere ve rba l  promise of part ies".  
Cf. A n  Enquiry i n t o  tho  Nature and E f f e c t s  o f  the Paper Cred i t  o f  
Groat B r i t a i n .  Unfor tunate ly ,  whm reason* i s  roplaced by f a i t h  
cums, such lessons have t o  be l e a r n t  over and over again a t  the  
expense o f  m i l l i o n s  o f  innocent  people. 
With t h e  s h a r p  upward ad jus tment  o f  interest  rates i n  t h e  
Uni ted  S t a t e s  t h e  movement of f u n d s  away from t h e  d o l l a r  d i d  g e t  
r e v e r s e d ,  and n o t  o n l y  was t h e r e  a qu ick  drop i n  go ld  p r i c e s  bu t  t h e  
s x t e r n a l  v a l u a  of t h e  d o l l a r  r o s e  perceptibly (with  t h e  d e u t s c h e  mark- 
d o l l a r  rate go ing  u p  t o  n e a r l y  2.3 by t h e  end of 1981). Since  high 
i n t e r e s t  rates checked speculative h o l d i n g s  of commodities t h e  i n f l a -  
t i o n a r y  movement of p r i c e s  was a l s o  checked t o  some ex ten t .  However, 
at  t h e  same time, h i g h  i n t o r e s t  rates had t h e  e f f e c t  of p r e c i p i t a t i n g  
. . 
t h e  c o l l a p s e  of b u s i n e s s  s n t e r p r i s e s  a l l  ovor  and d e t e r r i n g  t h e  r e q u i r e d  
in,vestmont i n  manufacturing i n d u s t r y ;  moreover, t h o  rise i n  t h e  e x t e r n a l  
v a l u e  o f  t h e  d o l l a r  a d v e r s e l y  a f f o c t e d  t h e  c o m p e t i t i v e  p o s i t i o n  o f  many 
t r a d i t i o n a l  American i n d u s t r i e s .  
1 f . t h e r e f o r e  h igh  i n t e r e s t  r a t o s  and a much a p p r e c i a t e d  v a l u e  of ' 
t h e  d o l l a r  become a more l a s t i n g  f e a t u r e  o f  U.S. oconomic p o l i c y  it could 
l o a d  t o  a p r o c e s s  of " d e - i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n "  i n  t h e  United S t a t o s  o v e r  a 
p e r i o d ,  much a s  i n  B r i t a i n  whoro t h i s  p rocoss  h a s  r e s u l t e d  i n  widespread 
c l o s u r e  of i n d u s t r i a l  e n t e r p r i s e s  and d r a s t i c  r e d u c t i o n  i n  i n d u s t r i a l  
employment from n e a r l y  12 m i l l i o n  i n  1966 t o  well below 8 m i l l i o n  by t h e  
middlo of 1981. Of course ,  well bofore  such a  development, t h e  powerful 
i n t e r e s t s  t h a t  are h u r t  by t h e  p o l i c y  mry w a i l  b r i n g  abou t  its r e v e r s a l  , 
i n  t h e  United S t a t e s .  
There  i s  m c h  more t h a t  can  be s a i d  and developed on t h i s  theme, 
bu t  I s h a l l  r e f r a i n  from doing s o  f o r  l a c k  of timo. A l l  I need t o  add 
are a few o b s e r v a t i o n s  about  t h e  f u t u r e  o f  t h e  a p p a r e n t l y  c o n t r a d i c t o r y ,  
p o l i c i e s  t h a t  are being foll.nstnrl hy t h n  llr~i.karl S t a t a s ,  d n c n  t h a t  is what 
matters most t n  un a t  present .  
I n  t h e  f i r s t  place, i t  would be c l e a r l y  r a t h e r  na ive  t o  toke 
l i t e r a l l y  t h e  p o l i c y  pronouncements o f  President  Reagan or  assume that,  
when he seeks t o  r a i s e  defenco o u t l a y  and c u t  taxes wh i l e  t a l k i n g  o f  
doing away with b i g  government and budgot d e f i c i t s ,  he does so out o f  
ignorance o r  s t u p i d i t y .  Ho mrst  know tha t ,  when t o t a l  government expen- 
d i t u r e  i s  as h i g h  as one- th i rd  o f  the  gross n a t i o n a l  product o f  t h e  
Uqited States, i t  i s  no t  going t o  bo easy doing 'any o f  these things. 
Ho must a l so  know t h a t  such spending i s  now e s s e n t i a l  t o  keep a l i v e  
a l a r g e  p a r t  o f  American i n d u s t r y  (which i s  v i t a l  f o r  cont inu ing  p o l i -  
o 
t i c a l  support i n  t h e  country)  a n d b u i l d  up some o f  t h e  new gene:attion 
o f  i n d u s t r i e s  w i t h  the  R & D and o tho r  funds prov ided through t.he 
defence budget (since they are v i t a l  f o r  the  future) .  A l l  he i s  
at tempt ins t o  do the re fo re  i s  p r o h d l y  t o  reassure some o f  tho  concerned 
scc t ions  o f  American b i g  business, i n  language they understand, t h a t  
they need n o t  worry; t h i n  may soon con t rad i c to ry  t o  others, hu t  i t  has 
i t s  own i , ~ t e r n a l  p o l i t i c a l  l o g i c .  
S i m i l a r  cons idera t ions  are perhaps a l so  v a l i d  i n  t h e  case o f  t h e  
pronouncements of Chairman Volcker o f  tho  'edoral Resorvo. I f  h igh  . 
i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  i n  t h e  Un i tcd  States are s t r i k i n g  a t  the  r o o t  o f  A ~ o r i c a n  
f i n a n c i a l  i n t o r e s t s  (as they woru boginning t o  r e c e n t l y  i n  ~ e x i c o )  they 
w i l l  o f  course be brought down, i r r c s p u c t i v e  of what i t  coats and what 
r u b s  and conventions have t o  be changed. But please do n o t  l e t  us 
say t h a t  too loud, i n  case o thers  t h i n k  t h a t  i n f l a t i o n  w i l l  soon be ou t  
of c o n t r o l  i n  t h e  Uni ted States and t h e  confidence i n - t h e  f u t u r e  of tho  
d o l l a r  i s  thereby shaken. 
T h i s  c o n f i d e n c e  i s  a  v e r y  f r a g i l e  t h i n g  t h a t  deponds l a r g o l y  
on what t h e  b i g  b u s i n o s s  and f i n a n c i a l  i n t e r e s t s  i n  t h e  world t h i n k  
of i t  md does  n o t  a lways  have n e c e s s a r i l y  any o t h e r  o b j e c t i v e  o r  
r a t i o n a l  b a s i s  t o  it. T h i s  is s o  p a r t i c u l a r l y  because  t h e y  i n  t u r n  
depend f o r  t h o i r  gu idance  on a l l  k i n d s  of baromoters  i n  h i g h l y  s e n s i t i v e  
and e s s e n t i a l l y  speculative marke t s  ( i n c l u d i n g  t h e  s t o c k  exchanges);  
and h e r e  New York i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  n o t o r i o u s  f o r  i t s  propensities. As 
Keynos p o i n t e d  o u t  l o n g  ago,  "even o u t s i d e  t h e  f i e l d  of f i n a n c e ,  
Americans are a p t  t o  be unduly i n t e r e e t o d  i n  d i e c o v e r i n g  what average 
o p i n i o n  b e l i e v e s  average  o p i n i o n  t o  be; and t h i s  n a t i o n a l  weakness 
f i n d s  i ts nemesis  i n  t h e  s t o c k  market.....Speculators may do no harm 
as bubb les  on a  s t e a d y  s t r e a m  of  o n t e r p r i s o .  But t h e  p o s i t i o n  i s  
s e r i o u s  when e n t e r p r i s e  becomes t h e  bubble on a  whirl-pool of specu la t ion" .  
U n f o r t u n a t e l y  f o r  t h e  United S t a t e s ,  from time t o  t ime  Keynes l i k e  Marx 
t u r n s  o u t  t o  have been p e r f e c t l y  r i g h t .  
What I am t r y i n g  t o  s u g g e s t  t h o r e f o r o  i s  t h a t  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  
and economic l o a d e r s h i p  i n  t h e  United S t a t e s  i s  now walking o n ' t i g h t  
r o p e  t r y i n g  t o  r e c o n c i l e  powerful  c o n f l i c t i n g  i n t e r e s t s  w i t h i n  t h e  
c o u n t r y  and o u t s i d e ;  t h a t  i n  s p i t e  of  t h o  d o c t r i n a i r e  c l o a k  t h e y  wear 
t h e y  am perhaps ,  l i k e  t h e  l e a d e r s h i p  now i n  s o c i a l i s t  c o u n t r i e s ,  
e s s e n t i a l l y  p ragmat ic  i n  o u t l o o k ;  t h a t  t h e y  unders tand  v e r y  w e l l  t h a t  
t h e  c o n f i d e n c e  i n  t h e  d o l l a r  i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  a m a t t e r  of  p r o v i d i n g . t h e  
r i g h t  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  and p o l i t i c a l  a p p e a l  t o  t h o s e  w i t h  l a r g e  f i n a n c i a l  
i n t e r e s t s ;  and t h a t  t h e y  w i l l  change t h e  r u l e s  of  t h e  game o r  band any 
ru le  (as t h e y  have done many times o v e r  and now a g a i n  i n  t h e  a f t e r m a t h  
of t h e  Mexican c r i s i s )  i n  s u p p o r t  o f  t h e i r  n a t i o m l  and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
ob j e b t i v e s .  
A t  t h e  same time, t h e  gamc t h a t  i s  being p layed i s  a very 
r i s k y  one. It i s  n o t  on ly  t h a t  i n  t h e  present maze o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
f inance, basod on an enormous and over-bloated s t r u c t u r e  o f  debts, 
something untoward can always happen. That may appear now t o  be t h e  
most ser ious  t h r e a t 5  bu t  t h e  Un i ted  States has perhaps enough resources 
a t  i t s  command.to be able t o  scrape through such c r i s i s .  A much more 
ser ious  cause f o r  alarm i s  t h a t  t h e  garna i nc ludes  a lso p lay ing  w i t h  
armaments 
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of a l l  kinds, s e t t i n g  people against  oach other, and p r o f i -  
t h a t  too. 
~rmaments' are indeed the  b iggest  business now. 
know a t  our  own cos t  t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h i s  game i n  South 
we cont inue t o  pay a h igh  p r i c e  f o r  it. The pressures now 
being app l ied  on Japan t o  dovote a l a r g o r  p ropo r t i on  o f  i t s  resources 
f o r  armaments and dofence, and no t  t o  p r o t e c t  i t s  f a r m  products so h e a v i l y  
(so t h a t  Japan becomes very much more dependant on impor ts  from t h e  
Un i ted  States), are a lso  p a r t  o f  t h i s  game; and t h i s  i s  no doubt a major 
f a c t o r  i n  t h e  emerging p o l i t i c a l  re-alignments i n  Japan. I n  fac t ,  einco 
t h e  stakes o f  t h e  game are very high, t he re  cou ld  even be s t rong  tempta- 
t i o n  t o  s t a r t  an open g l o b a l  c o n f l i c t  i n  which t h e  Un i ted  States and 
thu  d o l l a r  can be symbolized as the  defenders o f  "democracy" and 
"freedom". 
There are of course s u f f i c i e n t  c o n f l i c t s  o f  i n t e r e s t  between 
tho  Un i ted  Sta tes  a d  even i t s  c l o s o s t  pa r tne rs  f o r  them t o  see through 
t h i s  game and f r u s t r a t e  i t s  r e a l i z a t i o n  t o  t h e  ex ten t  t h a t  i t  s u i t s  
them. The manner i n  which coun t r i os  o f  Wostern Europe have d e f i e d  t h e  
Un i ted  Sta tes  i n  t h e  mat te r  o f  t h e i r  agreement w i t h  t h e  Sov ie t  Union 
'. .n&,~.,,jeie 
on B t t l p i p e - l i n e s  i s  amplo evidence o f  such i n - b u i l t  co r rec t i ves  within 
t ho  e x i s t i n g  frame o f  i n t e r n a t i o r - 1  p o l i t i c a l  re la t i ons .  Japan could 
a l so  prove t o  be a toughor nut t o  crack than some i n  t h e  Un i ted  S t k e s  
now imagine, p a r t i c u l a r l y  i f  a t  an opportune t ima tho  Soviet  Union were 
t o  make some p o l i t i c a l  and economic moves a t t r a c t i v e  t o  Japan (which 
i t  i s  i n  f a c t  w e l l  p laced t o  do). 
Above al1,tho moves t h e  Scv ie t  Union and China have made 
r e c e n t l y  t o  come c lose r  together  are f u l l  of p o s s i C i l i t i e s  f o r  the  
future.  It i s  i n  f a c t  n o t  impossib le t o  v i s u a l i z e  ways o f  r s c o n c i l i n g  
c o n f L i c t s  o f  p o l i t i c a l  and economic interests w i t h i n  East Asia t h a t  
cou ld  become i n c r e a s i g n l y  acceptable t o  t h e  Soviet  Union, China and 
Japan i n  t h e  face o f  some o f  the  p o l i c i e s  now being fo l l owed  by the  
Un i ted  States. This  has t h e  p o t e n t i a l  a lso  f o r  removing the  sharper 
edges i n  some o f  t ho  c o n f l i c t s  t h a t  have been p laguing both  South-East 
Asia and South Asia. 
On t h e  present out look, t ho  f a c t o r s  under ly ing  tho  g l o b a l  slump 
seem u n l i k e l y  t o  fado away i n  t h e  n e q  future.  The c o n f l i c t s  o f  i n t e r e s t  
between t h e  o l d e r  i n d u s t r i a l  s t ruc tu res  o f  Uni ted States and B r i t a i n  
and o f  t h e  newer and more e f f i c i e n t  s t r u c t u r e s  o f  France, Germany and 
Japan can get  reso lved on l y  over a f a i r l y  l ong  pe r iod  o f  time, par t i cu-  
l a r l y  s ince  most o f  them do n o t  be l i eve  i n  t h e  k i n d  o f  planned investment 
programmes t h a t  cou ld  have otherwise helped t o  accelerato t h e  process. 
W i th in  t h e  framework o f  r e l a t i o n s  i n  which they are now operating, no 
one o f  them except the  Un i ted  Sta tss  t o  some sx ten t ' en joys  t h e  f l s x i b i -  
l i t y  e s s e n t i a l  f o r  f o l l o w i n g  independent po l i c ies .  Prasident  Mi t te rand 
i s  now d iscover ing  t h i s  a t  h i s  cost. Since major changes i n  p o l i c y  
r e q u i r e  much more agreement hntwnon thnm than t h e i r  i n t e r e s t $  now 
permi t ,  t.ie p r o c e s s  of fundamentc'. r ~ s t r u c t u r i n g  o f . t h e  k i n d  r o q u i r e d  
t o  r e v i v e  t h e i r  economies i n  a s u s t a i n a d  manner i s  l i k e l y  t o  t a k e  a  
f a i r l y  l o n g  p e r i o d ,  wi th  many ups  and downs, las t ing a t  least a decade 
b u t  more probably  t h e  r e s t  of t h i s  cuntury.  
The i n t e r n a l  c o n f l i c t s  o f  i n t e r e s t s  w i t h i n  t h e  United S t a t e s ,  
though perhaps  easier t o  be roso lvod  because t h e m  a r e  ve ry  s t r o n g  
commonality o f ' i n t o r e s t s  as w e l l  ( a s  r e f l e c t e d  i n  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  
n o t i o n  of ' f i n a n c e - c a p i t a l i s r , ? ) ,  may a l s o  t a k e  time t o  g e t  s o r t e d  
out.  I n  any case t h i s  depends on v a r i o u s  p o l i t i c a l  p r o c e s s e s  t h a t  
would be a f f e c t e d  c o n s i d e r a b l y  by what happens meanwhile b a t h  i n  t h e  
Uni ted  S t a t e s  and i n  t h e  r e s t  of t h o  world. 
I t  i s  c e r t a i n l y  i n  t h o  i n t o r o s t s  of t h e  rest of t h e  world, 
i n c l u d i n g  u s  i n  I n d i a ,  t o  s o e  t h a t  t h e s e  v a r i o u s  c o n f l i c t s  o f  i n t e r e s t  
i n  t h e  United S t a t o s m d  o u t s i d e  f i n d  some k ind  of r e s o l u t i o n  that 
would effectively s t o p  t h e  d r i f t  t o  w a r  i n ' t h e  v a r i o u s  c o n t i n e n t s  now 
i n  avidonce,and c r e a t e  over  a p e r i o d  of t i m e  a new i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
framswork i n  which a l l  c o u n t r i e s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h o s e  belonging t o  t h e  
T h i r d  World, can deve lop  r a p i d l y  wi thou t  being s u f f o c a t e d  and suppressed. 
I t  is towards  t h i s  end t h a t  every  e f f o r t  h a s  t o  be made now. 
The New I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Economic Order,  which t h o  c o u n t r i e s  o f  t h e  
T h i r d  World have been t r y i n g  t o  promote over  t h e  l a s t  decade (wi th  l i t t l e  
s u c c e s s ) ,  i s  t o o  romant ic  i n  i t s  concep t ion  t o  be r o a l i z a b l e  i n  t h e  
n e a r  f u t u r e .  I t  is a t  b b s t  a s l o g a n  f o r  mobi l i z ing  p o l i t i c a l  op in ion  
a t  t h e  g l o b a l  l e v o l .  Thero are however o t h e r  p o s s i b i l i t i e s , b a s e d  on 
s e l f - i n t e r e s t  
more real is t ic  r e c o g n i t i o n  of t h e  e lements  of powerdand ideo logy  i n  t k a  
world a t  i t s  p r o s o n t  s t a g e  of dovohpment.  Some h i n t s  of t h e s e  
p o s s i b i l i t i e s  have been a l r e a d y  givon,  b u t  t h e y  need t o  be c a r e f u l l y  
t h o u g h t  o u t  i n  more c o n c r e t e  d e t a i l  and abovo a l l  made i n t o  an 
a c c o p t a b l o  p o l i t i c d  and economic agenda f o r  a l a r g e  numbor of 
c o u n t r i e s , i n c l u d i n g  n o t  o n l y  t h o s e  i n  t h o  T h i r d  World who are a b l e  
t o  s t a n d  up t o  t h e  United S t a t e s  bu t  a l s o  S o v i e t  Union, China and, 
o t h e r  s o c i a l i s t  c o u n t r i e s ,  and h o p e f u l l y  a l s o  somu c o u n t r i e s  i n  
Western Europe such  as France,  Swedcn, Norway, and I t a l y .  (West 
Germany and Japan a r e  porhaps  still t o o  c l o s e l y  t i e d  up wi th  t h e  
Uni ted S t a t e s  t o  cuntomplntc  a s e r i o u s  break wi th  i t  a t  t h i s  s t a g e ;  however 
Canada may well be more respons ive) .  
Perhaps  a  f i r s t  s t e p  i n  t h i s  d i r e c t i o n  could  be m o b i l i z a t i o n  
C ~ o p e n a t i v e  
of p o l i t i c a l  s u p p o r t  i n  f a v o u r  of a n e w ~ O r g a n i s a t i o n  o f  Non-Aligned 
and A l l i e d  Count r ius  (on t h e  l i n e s  of t h e  earlier Organ isa t ion  f o r  
Economic Cooperat ion and D e v e l ~ p m ~ n t  s e t  up i n  Europe a f t e r  t h e  
Second World W a r ) .  I n d i a  can p lay  a  major r o l e  i n  such  a c o o p e r a t i v e  
endeavour;  and t h i s  c o u l d  g i v e  a new and very  r e l e v a n t  economic dimen- 
s i o n  t o  o u r  t r a d i t i o n a l  p o l i c y  of nun-alignment. 
The f a c t  t h a t  we a r e  now g e t t i n g  h e a v i l y  i n d e b t e d  t o  t h e  I n t e r -  
n a t i o n a l  Monetary Fund (which h a s  t a k e n  t h e  p l a c e  of t h e  Bank of England 
i n  t h e  o l d  B r i t i s h  Empire) need n o t  r e a l l y  m a t t e r  all t h a t  w c h ,  provided 
we know how t o  p l a y  . t h o  game accord ing  t o  o u r  i n t e r e s t s  
r u l e s  
and, t o  t h e  extent p o s s i b l e ,  g e t  the /changed through c o l l e c t i v e  act ion.  
However t h a t  way dous n o t  l i c  i n  s p l e n d r o u s  wake of r e s o u r c e s  on t h r  
Asiad o r  i n  being t a k e n  i n  by t h e  promiso of t h e  wonders o f  modern 
technol.ogy and market ing t h a t  m u l d - r a t i o n a l s  can b r i n g  (whether i n  
t h o  form o f  t o l o v i s i o n  so ts  and low-cost baby cars o r  through t h e  
l a r g e  f o r e i g n  markets they w i l l  opcn up fo r  us.). These a m  t h e  
k i n d  of gemas t h a t  t h e  presont  r u l e r s  o f  the  Uni ted States would 
l o v o  t o  see us go t  l o s t  i n ,  and they  can on l y  l a a d  t o  our ruin as 
hoovy debtors p u l l e d  by our nose. 
To avo id  t h i s ,  wo s h a l l  have t o  have a c lose  l o o k  a t  some o f  
our p o l i c i e s  t o  cu t  ou t  a l l  t h e  f r i l l s  and f r i v o l i t i o s  (not t o  mention 
tho  p o l i t i c a l  and oconamic cor rup t ions)  through which a h i g h  p ropo r t i on  
o f  our scarce rssourcos i s  now being f r i t t o r e d  away; and concentrate very 
much more on s e l f - r e l i a n t  dcvelopmont basad mainly on our  own capabi- 
l i t i e s  i n  scienco, technology and organisation. I n  o ther  words, we 
need t o  hava a more mature understanding o f  our  uwaknosses and strength. 
The choice i s  t he re  f o r  us t o  make and ac t  upon i f  we havo tho  p o l i -  
t i c a l  und?rstanding and Fores igh t  t o  do so. 
December 11, 1982. 
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